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Abstract 
Involuntary semantic memories or mind-pops consist of isolated fragments of one’s 
semantic knowledge (e.g., a word or a sentence, proper name, image or a melody) that 
come to mind unexpectedly, without any deliberate attempt to recall them. They can be 
experienced as alien and uncontrollable, and may share some phenomenological 
similarities with hallucinations. The aim of the present study was to investigate the nature 
and frequency of mind-pops in people with schizophrenia (N=37), as well as clinically 
depressed (N=31) and non-clinical controls (N=31). Results showed that schizophrenia 
patients reported experiencing mind-pops more frequently than both depressed and non-
clinical controls. Schizophrenia patients also reported a wider range of different types of 
mind-pops than non-clinical controls. The depressed group did not differ from non-
clinical controls in the frequency and range of mind-pops, indicating that mind-pops are 
not characteristic of clinical populations in general, but may be particularly prevalent in 
patients with schizophrenia. The possible implications of this finding to current models of 
auditory verbal hallucinations are discussed and the need for future research in this area is 
emphasized.  
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1. Introduction 
‘‘Just before falling asleep, I often become aware of a kind of one-sided conversation going on in 
an adjacent section of my mind, quite independently from the actual trend of my thoughts. It is a 
neutral, detached, anonymous voice, which I catch saying words of no importance to me 
whatever—an English or a Russian sentence, not even addressed to me, and so trivial that I hardly 
dare give samples...’’ (p. 33, Nabokov, 1966) 
In this passage, Nabokov appears to be referring to a phenomenon which several 
decades later was defined by Kvavilashvili (1997) as involuntary semantic memories or 
mind-pops. They come to mind unexpectedly, without any deliberate attempt to recall 
them, and consist of isolated fragments of one’s semantic knowledge, rather than 
meaningful episodes from one’s personal past (Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 2004). 
Although sometimes people do experience these mind-pops during altered states of 
consciousness (i.e., when falling asleep or waking up), majority occur during waking 
hours. A typical example would involve a person carrying out an everyday activity (e.g., 
brushing teeth) and thinking about some unrelated matters (e.g., what to buy for a dinner 
party), when suddenly a word or a saying (‘jingle bell’, ‘all is well that ends well’), 
someone’s name (Niccollo Machiavelli), an image (of Twin Towers), or a familiar tune 
(American National Anthem) pops into mind and amazes the person with its irrelevance 
to a current situation (cf. Mandler, 1986). Although mind-pops are predominantly one-off 
occurrences, occasionally, they may come to mind repeatedly (especially the musical 
mind-pops) and be difficult to get rid of. Recurring melodies and songs have been 
recently studied under a variety of names such as “earworms”, “stuck song syndrome” 
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(Beaman and Williams, 2010; Williamson et al., in press), or involuntary musical 
imagery (Liikkanen, in press). 
In terms of their content, these verbal, visual and musical mind-pops are different 
from several other involuntary phenomena described in the literature. For example, 
ordinary involuntary autobiographical memories, as well as repetitive intrusive memories 
of negative events, both involve sudden remembering of particular episodes from one’s 
past, such as remembering a trip to Georgia when seeing a holiday advert or 
remembering being mugged when hearing steps behind in the dark, respectively 
(Berntsen, 1996; 2009; Brewin et al., 2010; Schlagman and Kvavilashvili, 2008). In 
contrast, mind-pops refer to fragments of semantic or autobiographical knowledge 
without accompanying contextual details characteristic of episodic memories (i.e., the 
what, where, and when aspects of the remembered event). Mind-pops are also different 
from intrusive thoughts, reported in clinical and non-clinical populations, which consist 
of sudden and often repetitive thoughts or images about violent or otherwise unpleasant 
acts, for example, thoughts about hitting someone, having sex in a public place or being 
poisoned (Clark and Purdon, 1995). Moreover, while intrusive thoughts are highly 
repetitive, most mind-pops are one-off occurrences. It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that mind-pops may constitute a distinct class of decontextualized involuntary cognitions 
that merit closer examination.  
 Initial research conducted on mind-popping by Kvavilashvili and Mandler (2004), 
using single case, diary and questionnaire methods, has resulted in several interesting 
findings. For example, mind-pops are predominantly experienced in the form of 
words/phrases, and less frequently as visual images and music. This was shown in a diary 
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study with 50 undergraduates, where the percentages of recorded verbal, visual and 
musical mind-pops were 61%, 12% and 27%, respectively (Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 
2004, Study 4). Furthermore, mind-pops have consistently been reported to occur when 
people were alone and engaged in habitual everyday activities, requiring few attentional 
resources (e.g., resting, having breakfast, or washing up). Most importantly, finding cues 
in one’s environment or thoughts that trigger the mind-pops is extremely difficult. Even 
when adopting fairly lenient criteria for what constituted a trigger, cues were only 
detected in approximately 20 to 37% of cases, in contrast to involuntary autobiographical 
memories, where cues were identified in 80% of cases (Study 4). Finally, in almost 50% 
of reported mind-pops participants were able to ascertain that the actual or related 
contents of the mind-pop had recently been encountered in one’s environment or internal 
thoughts. This indicates that the occurrence of a particular mind-pop is not an entirely 
random event and could be due to a long-term priming mechanism where a single 
encounter with a particular stimulus or internal thought can cause persistent activation 
and spreading in semantic network which may then result in sudden conscious experience 
of this content in a seemingly unrelated context (Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 2004). 
One important question that has not been addressed in this new area of research 
refers to the frequency and prevalence of mind-pops in clinical samples. Mental disorders 
(e.g., depression, PTSD, OCD) are often characterized by various forms of cognitive 
intrusions, such as intrusive memories and images of traumatic events, repetitive negative 
thoughts and compulsions (Brewin et al., 2010). Due to this increased tendency for 
cognitive intrusions, it is possible that patients also experience mind-pops more 
frequently than non-clinical populations. In this respect research on patients with 
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schizophrenia may be particularly relevant, given that their cognitive intrusions in the 
form of auditory and visual hallucinations appear to have several interesting similarities 
with mind-pops, both in terms of their automatic nature and their contents. Indeed, non-
clinical participants have been reporting having no control over their mind-pops, which 
appear to come and go as they wish. Due to their unexpected nature, mind-pops can 
sometimes disrupt the activity that the person is engaged in, and be even perceived as 
“alien”, especially when they are experienced without any obvious triggers, or when they 
occur in the form of recurring words or melodies (Stern, 1938).  All these features are 
also characteristic of auditory and visual hallucinations (Morrison, 2001; Nayani and 
David, 1996a). David (2004), for example, has even suggested modifying the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) definition of hallucinations to include the 
aspect of uncontrollability. 
Another interesting similarity between the two phenomena is that although both 
mind-pops and hallucinations can occasionally take place during altered states of 
consciousness, such as moments of falling asleep or waking up (i.e., hypnagogic and 
hypnopompic hallucinations), both tend to primarily occur during waking hours, when 
one is alone and/or engaged in undemanding everyday/leisure activities. In addition, 
finding immediate triggers for both, mind-pops and hallucinations, is often very difficult 
(Delespaul et al., 2002; Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 2004). Finally, similarities are also 
present in the varied contents of mind-pops and hallucinations. Thus, hallucinations in 
schizophrenia occur predominantly in verbal format (i.e., hearing single words, 
phrases/sentences and conversations), but patients can also experience visual and musical 
hallucinations (Baba and Hamada, 1999; Nayani and David, 1996b; Saba and Keshavan, 
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1997; Stephane et al., 2003; Waters et al., 2006). In line with this, mind-pops occur most 
frequently in the form of single words, names and phrases, but non-clinical participants 
also report experiencing visual and musical mind-pops (albeit to a lesser degree) 
(Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 2004, Study 4). 
The analysis of these similarities led Elua (2007) to suggest a possibility that 
mind-pops could be the raw cognitive material from which hallucinations are constructed 
in schizophrenia. As an initial step in assessing this novel idea it is necessary to examine 
the nature and frequency of mind-pops in schizophrenia. Therefore, the aim of the present 
study was to examine whether patients with schizophrenia are experiencing mind-pops 
more frequently than other clinical populations (e.g., patients with depression) and non-
clinical controls. To this aim, we administered a brief Mind-Popping Questionnaire 
(MPQ; Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 2004), assessing the frequency and different types of 
experienced mind-pops, to patients with schizophrenia, major depressive disorder 
(MDD), and non-clinical controls. It was hypothesized that if mind-pops and 
hallucinations were related phenomena, then the schizophrenia group would report a 
higher frequency and a larger variety of mind-pops than both depressed and control 
groups. If however, increased mind-popping was a general characteristic of clinical 
conditions, then there would be no reliable differences between schizophrenic and 
depressed participants, and both would score higher than controls.  Additionally, mind-
popping frequency was examined as a function of presence/absence of hallucinations in 
schizophrenia patients at the time of participation in the study.  
2. Material and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
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The initial sample consisted of 103 participants (29 males and 70 females), where 
31 were non-clinical controls, 32 – depressed clinical controls, and 40 – schizophrenia 
patients. Clinical participants were recruited from a Day Treatment Program for 
chronically mentally ill individuals and an Out-Patient Mental Health Clinic. Non-clinical 
controls were the support staff and the psychotherapists employed by the same Clinics, 
who were not familiar with the research in this area, and were blind to the aims and 
hypothesis of the study. 
To ensure that only high functioning clinical patients were included in the study, 
the entire sample was administered the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE: Folstein 
et al., 1975), and instead of a standard cut off point of 24, we used a stricter cut off point 
of 26 (the lowest score for the non-clinical control group). This resulted in the exclusion 
of 1 depressed and 3 schizophrenia patients, and the final samples consisted of 37 
schizophrenia patients (19 males, 18 females), 31 depressed controls (9 males, 22 
females), and 31 non-clinical controls (1 male, 30 females).  
The procedure for diagnosing the patients was identical in both Clinics. In 
particular, at the moment of admission each patient underwent the initial intake 
assessment conducted by the licensed psychotherapist. The diagnosis was then discussed 
with a team of clinicians in a disposition conference. The next step involved psychiatric 
evaluation (including the independent assignment of the diagnosis) conducted by the staff 
psychiatrist (medical doctor). In addition, diagnosis was reviewed and re-evaluated every 
three months by treating psychotherapists and psychiatrists, and all patients received 
annual psychiatric re-evaluations with the purpose of reviewing the assigned diagnosis 
and recommended treatment plan. Patients were categorized according to DSM-IV 
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(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria. Out of 37 schizophrenia patients, 23 
were diagnosed with Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type, 11 with Schizophrenia 
Undifferentiated Type, and 3 with Residual Type. All 31 depressed patients had a 
diagnosis of MDD without psychotic features. 
In addition to receiving the already confirmed diagnoses for all of the participants, 
the first author who is a licensed clinician, conducted independent clinical interviews 
with each participant, prior to including them in the study. The purpose of these 
interviews was to confirm the presence of the diagnosis at the moment of participation, as 
well as to specifically identify the presence/absence of hallucinations in the schizophrenia 
group. Thus, out of 37 schizophrenia patients, 15 were not experiencing hallucinations or 
delusions at the time of testing (although all had previously experienced auditory 
hallucinations). The remaining 22 participants reported experiencing hallucinations at the 
time of testing (auditory hallucinations in 19 cases and visual hallucinations in 3 cases). 
All schizophrenia patients were receiving anti-psychotic medications, and all depressed 
patients (with the exception of two) were on antidepressants.  
2.2. Background variables as a function of group 
Table 1 presents the mean age, MMSE scores (Folstein et al., 1975), and years of 
education as a function of group. No reliable differences emerged between the groups in 
their mean MMSE scores (all ps>0.10). In terms of age, depressed patients were older 
than the schizophrenia and control participants (p=0.001 and p=0.018, respectively), who 
did not differ from each other (p=0.44). On the other hand, control participants had spent 
significantly more years in education than either schizophrenia or depressed patients 
(both ps<0.0001), whose means did not differ from each other (p=0.49).  
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2.3. Materials and procedure 
All participants completed the Mind Popping Questionnaire (MPQ; Kvavilashvili 
and Mandler, 2004) in an individual session with the researcher (I. E.), who explained the 
nature of involuntary semantic memories and encouraged participants to ask clarifying 
questions while they were working on the questionnaire. The MPQ consists of four 
questions designed to measure the frequency, as well as the type of the content (e.g., 
whether they are words, phrases, images, sounds, etc.) of involuntary mind-pops. It starts 
with a short description of the mind-popping phenomenon and explains how it differs 
from involuntary autobiographical memories. After the description, the first question asks 
participants to state (Yes/No) whether they have ever experienced the phenomenon 
themselves. Those participants who respond by ‘No’ discontinue the questionnaire, and 
those who answer ‘Yes’ proceed with the remaining questions. In Question 2 participants 
rate the frequency of experiencing mind-pops in their everyday lives on an 8-point scale 
with the following scale points: 1=only a few times in my entire life; 2=once or twice a 
year; 3=once or twice per 6 months; 4=once or twice a month; 5=once or twice a week; 
6=three or four times a week; 7=once or twice a day; and 8=three or more times a day. In 
Question 3, participants are presented with a list of possible mind-pops (see Table 3 for 
descriptions of different types of mind-pops), and are asked to indicate those types of 
mind-pops that they have experienced at least once in their lifetime. The final Question 4 
is optional and asks participants to provide examples of mind-pops from their everyday 
lives.     
3. Results 
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            Unless otherwise specified, the alpha level was set at .05 and the effect size was 
measured by partial eta squared (ηp2), with small, medium, and large effects defined as 
0.01, 0.06, and 0.16, respectively (Cohen, 1977). 
 3.1. Familiarity with the phenomenon of mind-popping (Question 1) 
All 37 individuals with schizophrenia reported having experienced mind-popping 
by answering “yes” to Question 1. By contrast, 6 out of 31 depressed participants (19%) 
and 5 out of 31 non-clinical control participants (16%) reported to have never 
experienced mind-pops in their entire lives. These differences between schizophrenia 
patients and depressed and non-clinical controls were statistically significant, χ2(2, N=99) 
=7.55, p=0.02. 
3.2. Frequency of reported mind-pops (Question 2)  
Next, we examined the self-reported frequency of mind-pops on an 8-point scale 
with options ranging from 1=only a few times in my entire life to 8=three or more times a 
day. The responses of those 6 depressed and 5 non-clinical control participants who did 
not experience mind-pops were classed as “0” (i.e., “never”). The one-way ANOVA on 
mean frequency ratings (Table 2, upper panel) resulted in a significant main effect of 
group with a large effect size, F(2,96)=15.28, MSE=5.39, p<0.0001, ηp2=0.24. Planned 
comparisons showed that, in line with predictions, schizophrenia patients reported 
experiencing mind-pops more frequently (M=6.05) than both depressed (M=3.74) and 
non-clinical control groups (M=3.13) (both ps<0.0001), who did not differ from each 
other (p=0.30). These results did not change when the age and years of education were 
entered as covariates in the above one-way ANOVA. Importantly, we also repeated the 
above analyses by excluding those 6 depressed and 5 non-clinical control participants 
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who denied ever experiencing mind-pops. Although this increased the mean frequency 
ratings in these groups to 4.64 (SD=2.33) and 3.73 (SD=1.73), respectively, the results 
remained the same with schizophrenia participants still scoring significantly higher than 
the non-clinical controls (p<.00001) and the clinically depressed participants (p=.009). 
Finally, to examine whether increased mind-popping experience was related to 
having hallucinations at the time of testing, the schizophrenia group was divided into 
those who reported having hallucinations (N=22) and those who had history of 
hallucinations (N=15), but were not reported to have hallucinations at the time of testing. 
Although the mean frequency rating was nominally higher in the former group (M=6.23, 
SD=1.80) than in the latter (M=5.80, SD=2.40), this difference was not statistically 
significant (F<1).  
3.3. Different types of mind-pops reported (Question 3) 
Table 3 shows the proportion of participants who reported experiencing each of 
the different types of mind-pops listed in Question 3. A series of Chi-squared tests did not 
result in statistically reliable differences between the three groups in terms of whether 
they reported experiencing (Yes/No) a particular type of mind-pop (the largest χ 2=4.68, 
p=0.096, for a melody). However, when we conducted a one-way ANOVA to examine 
the number of different types of mind-pops that participants experienced at least once in 
their lifetime (see Table 2), a significant effect of group emerged F(2,85)=3.19, 
MSE=4.46, p=0.046, ηp2 =0.07. Planned comparisons showed that schizophrenia patients 
experienced significantly larger range of different types of mind-pops than non-clinical 
controls (p=0.01), but did not differ from depressed participants (p=0.42), and the latter 
two groups did not differ from each other (p=0.13). 
 13 
3.4. Examples of mind-pops (Question 4) 
Although answer to this question was optional, 62% of schizophrenia patients, 
48% of depressed patients and 27% of controls provided examples of mind-pops 
experienced in their everyday lives. This difference between the groups was significant, 
χ2(2, N=88) =7.60, p=0.02, and follow up comparisons showed that schizophrenia group 
was more likely to give an example than the non-clinical control group (χ2(1, N=68) 
=7.60, p=0.006), but did not differ from the depressed group (p=0.28) who, in turn, did 
not differ from the non-clinical controls (p=0.13). Some of the examples provided by 
participants are shown in Appendix 1. In all three groups participants described similar 
contents (e.g., words, phrases, images, and melodies) and conditions in which they 
experienced mind-pops (i.e., during habitual mundane activities and in the absence of 
immediate triggers in the environment or one’s own thoughts). 
4. Discussion 
 The aim of the present study was to assess the novel hypothesis that schizophrenia 
patients would report experiencing involuntary semantic memories or mind-pops more 
frequently than clinical (depressed) and non-clinical controls. This prediction was based 
on the analysis of certain similarities between various forms of mind-pops and auditory, 
visual and musical hallucinations, which led Elua (2007) to propose a possible link 
between mind-pops in general population and hallucinatory experiences in schizophrenia. 
Increased frequency of involuntary semantic memories in schizophrenia can also be 
predicted from research showing increased or disorganized activation of semantic 
network in patients with schizophrenia and formal thought disorder, especially when 
using an indirect priming paradigm (see Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2008). Therefore, if events 
encountered in everyday life elicit stronger activation and/or wider spread of activation of 
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related concepts in the semantic network of schizophrenia patients (cf. Beck and Rector, 
2003), it is likely that these patients will experience involuntary semantic memories more 
frequently than non-clinical controls or clinically depressed participants.  
Results of the present study fully supported the main hypothesis. First, reliable 
group differences were established in terms of whether participants reported being 
familiar with the phenomenon of mind-popping. Consistent with the results of studies on 
student and non-student samples (Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 2004; Kvavilashvili et al., 
2009), 19% of depressed (N=6) and 16% of non-clinical control participants (N=5) 
reported to have never experienced the phenomenon of mind-popping. By contrast, all 
schizophrenia patients reported having mind-pops. Second, and most important, 
schizophrenia patients reported experiencing mind-pops more frequently than clinically 
depressed and non-clinical control groups, and having a wider range of different types of 
mind-pops than non-clinical controls. No significant differences emerged between the 
non-clinical controls and depressed participants in terms of the above variables, 
suggesting that increased mind-popping is not characteristic of clinical populations per 
se, but is certainly more of a common phenomenon reported by people with 
schizophrenia.  
Nonetheless, the proportions of participants who reported experiencing any of the 
nine possible types of mind pops did not result in significant group differences (see Table 
3). Thus, 57 to 60% of schizophrenia patients reported experiencing verbal mind-pops 
like words, phrases in native language and proper names, with even larger percentages 
reporting visual images (65%) and melodies (81%), which are comparable to proportions 
reported by depressed and non-clinical controls. Overall, the absence of group effects 
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may indicate that the phenomenology of mind-pops in schizophrenia patients is similar to 
that in non-clinical participants, and that the main difference between the groups is in the 
increased frequency of the mind-pops experienced by these patients. It is also intriguing 
that the increased frequency of mind-pops occurred both in patients who were 
experiencing hallucinations at the moment of the testing and in patients who had 
previously experienced hallucinations although not at the time of participation. Although 
this finding should be treated with caution (as we classified patients according to clinical 
interviews rather than any specific measures of hallucinations), it suggests that mind-
popping may not be linked to experiencing hallucinations at the time of investigation, and 
as such could be a trait rather than a state phenomenon in people with schizophrenia. In 
this respect, it would be interesting to compare hallucinating schizophrenia patients with 
those who have no previous history of hallucinations, to assess the link between mind-
popping and hallucinations more directly. 
One question that arises from this study concerns whether schizophrenia patients 
simply overestimated the frequency of mind-pops because they could not adequately 
distinguish them from hallucinations. If they were unclear about the difference between 
the two phenomena, then the hallucinating patients would have provided the higher 
frequency ratings than the non-hallucinating ones, but this was not the case. Additionally, 
the majority of examples provided by schizophrenia patients demonstrate that they 
understood the difference and did not confuse the two. Nevertheless, one possibility in 
future research might be to study mind-pops in people with schizophrenia using a diary 
method which may permit more naturalistic on line assessment of mind-popping in 
schizophrenia.  
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 Despite these potential limitations, we propose that our results have potentially 
interesting implications for cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations. Although 
there is some consensus amongst researchers that hallucinations are internal mental 
events that are misattributed to external sources, disagreement about the nature of these 
mental processes still exists (Jones, 2010). Various theorists have characterized them as 
inner speech (Allen, et al., 2007; Bentall, et al., 1991; Frith, 1996; Frith & Dolan, 1997), 
intrusive thoughts (Morrison, 2001), or episodic memories that lack contextual 
information (Hemsley, 2005; Waters et al., 2006). However, research comparing inner 
speech and hallucinations shows that there may not be considerable overlap in their 
phenomenological properties (e.g., Hoffman et al. 2008; Langdon et al., 2009), whereas 
research on intrusive thoughts in schizophrenia has been somewhat vague about the 
precise contents of such thoughts (e.g., Jones and Ferneyhough, 2009; Moritz and Larøi, 
2008; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2011; but see Morrisson and Baker, 2000).  
In contrast, a memory based model of Waters et al. (2006) suggests that auditory 
hallucinations may consist of fragments of episodic memories which lack accompanying 
contextual information. For example, the patient may have an auditory hallucination of 
hearing a comment made by a person who abused them in childhood without 
remembering at the time any other details of the context in which this comment was 
made. Although approximately 10% to 20% of hallucinations may link to memories of 
such traumatic experiences (see Jones, 2010), the contents of other hallucinations may 
involve more mundane fragments such as someone’s name mentioned on TV, a phrase 
overheard in a café, environmental noises (e.g., laughter), and music (Beck and Rector, 
2003). However, such fragments without contextual details can be described more 
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accurately as semantic, rather than episodic/autobiographical memories, and they seem to 
be similar to the contents of involuntary semantic memories or mind-pops examined in 
the present study. 
One problem faced by inner speech models (as well as those based on intrusive 
thoughts) is that they cannot fully explain the varied phenomenology of hallucinations 
occurring in the form of verbal material (e.g., words, sentences, verbal orders or 
comments), environmental sounds (laughing, knocking), music, or images in case of 
visual hallucinations (Badcock, 2010; Jones, 2010). Consequently, it has been proposed 
that different mechanisms may underlie these various forms of hallucinations. For 
example, Jones (2010) has suggested that while more complex auditory verbal 
hallucinations (in the form of running commentary or conversations) can be explained by 
cognitive mechanisms (e.g., inner speech), the seemingly random contents in the form of 
environmental sounds and music or images can be “more parsimoniously accounted for 
by a bottom-up ictal-based neurological model” (p.586). However, given that these 
different forms of hallucinations can co-occur in the same person, it is possible that there 
is one common cognitive mechanism that cuts across these different domains (cf. Moritz 
and Larøi, 2008). 
The results of the present study suggest that involuntary semantic memories and 
their underlying cognitive processes can be one such common mechanism behind the 
various manifestations of hallucinations in schizophrenia. This novel idea opens up 
several interesting avenues for future research. For example, it is unclear whether the 
content of mind-pops is more negative and distressing in patients with schizophrenia than 
in clinical and non-clinical controls, and whether schizophrenia patients are more likely 
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to actively suppress and/or control the occurrence of their mind-pops (cf. Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2006). If that is the case, then these processes can be responsible for 
transforming ordinary mind-pops into hallucinations (see Morrison, 2001). Alternatively, 
it is possible that the mind-pops in schizophrenia are not more negative than in non-
clinical population, but that the patients interpret them differently, i.e., as more alien and 
threatening (e.g., they may assume something strange is happening to them, and/or that 
they are “going mad”, etc.) (Beck and Rector, 2003; Morrison, 1998; 2001; Morrison et 
al., 1995). Another interesting question is to examine whether hallucinations are brought 
about by the same long-term priming mechanism that seems to underlie the occurrence of 
mind-pops in everyday life (Kvavilashvili and Mandler, 2004). If this is the case, then the 
contents of hallucinations may be primed by having encountered them in identical or 
similar form in one’s environment or thoughts in recent past (see Beck and Rector, 2003 
for examples of such priming of hallucinations in their patients with schizophrenia).  
In conclusion, this is a first attempt to demonstrate the increased frequency of 
involuntary semantic memories in patients with schizophrenia, suggesting a possible 
intriguing link between mind-pops and hallucinations. It is therefore possible that 
ordinary mind-pops, experienced as benign phenomena by non-clinical individuals, will 
take the exaggerated and abnormal form of auditory (and other types of) hallucinations in 
patients with schizophrenia. Future research should investigate in more detail the stages 
and various cognitive and non-cognitive processes that may enable this transformation.  
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Table 1  
Mean Age, MMSE Scores, and Mean Number of Years in Education as a Function of 
Group (Schizophrenia vs. Depressed vs. Non-Clinical Control).  
 
 
 
Variables 
Schizophrenia  
 
(N=37)  
 
Depressed 
 
(N=31) 
Non-Clinical 
Controls 
(N=31) 
 
 
 
F(2, 96) 
 
 
 
p-value 
Age 
Mean 
SD 
Range 
 
43.41a  
(10.36) 
21-62 
 
51.90b 
(11.39) 
24-63 
 
45.42 a 
(10.02) 
24-61 
 
 
5.75 
 
0.004 
MMSE  
Mean 
SD 
Range 
 
28.32 
(1.45) 
26-30 
 
28.84 
(1.16) 
26-30 
 
28.77 
(1.12) 
26-30 
 
 
1.70 
 
0.19 
Education  
Mean 
SD 
Range 
 
13.46a  
(2.89) 
8-22 
 
13.97a 
(2.18) 
10-19 
 
17.55b 
(3.79) 
8-27 
 
 
17.59 
 
0.000 
 
Note. Different subscripts indicate reliable differences between the two pairs of means 
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Table 2  
Mean Frequency of Mind-Pops and Mean Number of Different Types of Mind-Pops 
Reported as a Function of Group (Schizophrenia vs. Depressed vs. Non-Clinical Controls).  
                                                                      Participant Group  
 
 
 
 
 
Schizophrenia  
 
Depressed 
 
 
Controls 
 
Frequency of mind-pops a 
Mean 
SD 
Range 
Number of participants 
 
 
6.05  
(2.04) 
1-8 
N=37 
 
 
3.74 
(2.99) 
1-8 
N=31 
 
 
3.13 
(2.11) 
1-8 
N=31 
 
Number of different types of 
mind-pops b  
Mean 
SD 
Range 
Number of participants 
 
 
 
4.24 
(2.20) 
1-8 
N=37 
 
 
 
3.80 
(2.27) 
1-9 
N=25 
 
 
 
2.88 
(1.80) 
1-7 
N=26 
 
a Frequency was assessed on an 8-point scale (1=only a few times in my entire life; 
2=once or twice a year; 3=once or twice per 6 months; 4=once or twice a month; 5=once 
or twice a week; 6=three or four times a week; 7=once or twice a day; 8=three or more 
times a day). 
b This number could range from 1 to 9 (see Table 3 for types of mind-pops endorsed)  
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Table 3  
Proportion of Participants in Each Group (Schizophrenia, Depressed, Non-Clinical 
Control) who Reported Experiencing Each Type of Mind-Pop Listed Below at Least 
Once in Their Lifetime.                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of reported mind-pop 
 
 
Schizophrenia 
 
(N=37) 
 
Depressed 
 
(N=25) 
 
Control 
 
(N=26) 
1. A word in your native language 0.57 0.36 0.35 
2. A phrase or a sentence in your  
native language 
0.60 0.44 0.39 
3. A proper name  0.54 0.52 0.31 
4. A word in a foreign language –  
and you know its meaning 
0.32 0.32 0.19 
5. A word in a foreign language –  
and you do not know or have  
forgotten its meaning 
0.27 
 
0.16 0.08 
6. A visual image 0.65 0.84 0.65 
7. A sound 0.43 0.48 0.23 
8. A melody 0.81 0.56 0.65 
9. Other (please, specify) 0.05 0.12 0.04 
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Appendix 
Examples of Mind-Pops Reported by Participants in Optional Question 4 of the MPQ 
 
Type of the 
Mind-Pop 
Content of the Mind-Pop 
Words and 
phrases 
“While shaving, sometimes I have experienced a word or a phrase which has 
nothing to do with this activity.” 
“… I was on the couch and a strange word kept coming to mind – in exploring I 
realized it was the name of a character in a movie I’d seen many years ago.” 
“Sometimes I recall (involuntarily) words or phrases of some meaningful to me 
conversations (or evaluated by me as meaningful at a later time).” 
Visual 
images 
 “Visual images that seem to appear spontaneously, especially at bedtime, they 
are like moving photos.” 
 “As I am traveling I have a visual image of my mother unrelated to my thought 
processes.” 
 “While doing dishes, something pops into my head and its what I am wearing 
tomorrow.” 
Melodies “A line from a song, or a piece of music (musical phrase) that comes into my 
mind suddenly without any conscious precipitant; sometimes will re-occur 
several times over 1-2 day period.” 
 “Distracting music, specific songs unrelated to what I am doing at the time.” 
“A melody, or commercial jingle, will continue to ‘stay with me’ or ‘go through 
my head’, after having heard it”. 
 
 
 
